Avenging 7/7 By Gregory Fossedal Copyright © United Press International July 7, 2005, 10:07 a.m. Link to this story at The Washington Times WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Following Iraqi elections in January, U.S. and British officials reportedly revised long-standing plans for a strike in eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan -- aimed at destroying al-Qaida and its henchman-in-chief, Osama Bin Laden. In light of the barbaric attack on London, will those plans -- which today would require either massive European support or a diversion of U.S. forces in Iraq or NATO -- now move from the desk to the battlefield? Pakistan ultimatum More than a year ago, United Press International ("Bottom Line," April 22, 2004) reported on an ultimatum that U.S. sources who prefer anonymity said was delivered from Secretary of State Colin Powell to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Nab Osama Bin Laden, Powell warned, or the U.S. may have to do the job itself. (This report was later recycled by The New Republic, and then, by commentator Al Hunt.) Powell reportedly outlined elements of America's war plan to drive the point home. Musharraf assured Powell that U.S. involvement was unnecessary, and would, of course, harm his government's standing, and his own prospects for survival in a country still riddled with terrorists. In the months that followed, high-visibility Pakistani strikes were launched in the Afghan border region. It is not clear whether those efforts were truly aimed at nabbing the al-Qaida leadership, or at generating headlines, or both. In the event, they did not fully succeed. Regime change for al-Qaida? The question of how and whether to make a direct assault on al-Qaida the chief aim of the world's war on terror has riddled U.S. and European policy-makers from the start. It may be that by focusing on building Middle East democracy -- an effort making progress in Afghanistan and Iraq, and which has had beneficial impacts on regimes from Lebanon to Libya -- America has actually dealt al-Qaida a deeper, more strategic blow than had it quickly taken out Bin Laden and gone home. More than 150 years ago, French statesman Alexis de Tocqueville issued the following analysis of France's occupation of Algeria, a Western presence most ferociously opposed by the Bin Laden of the 1830s and '40s, Abd-el-Kader: "If Abd-el-Kader is destroyed, it will only be with the help of some of the tribes that are now subjected to him; his alliance must be dissolved rather than shattered.... Although he has created a force independent of the tribes, he has not destroyed the individual and collective force of those tribes. Several of them are actual nations, who in detaching themselves from him would immediately cause his downfall." Thus, in Tocqueville's eyes, what might be called a containment-plus approach to Arab terrorists, focusing on winning over surrounding tribes and Moslem states, made eminent sense. On the other hand, Tocqueville also observed: "The longer Abd-el-Kader's power lasts, the more improbable this event will become." He proved prescient in the years that followed, as el-Kader continued to riddle French troops and citizens, and even fellow Moslems cooperating with France, with deadly assaults. A senior Pentagon official who declines to be named calls the possibility of a quick strike, "regime change for Al Qaeda," adding, "it wouldn't eliminate their whole network or organization, but it would topple their senior leadership and set them on their heels for years" if Bin Laden were captured or eliminated. The Lind Doctrine Last fall, scholar William Lind, a respected analyst who was Gary Hart's principal advisor on military reform in the 1980s, issued a call for a very different type of response to 9/11-style events. Writing in "The American Conservative," a center-right journal that has generally opposed Mr. Bush regarding war in Iraq, Lind said the West should respond to terror attacks with an immediate, massive, savage, almost deliberately knee-jerk attack on terrorist outposts -- followed by strategic withdrawal and even isolationism. Lind's strategy would apply maximum, brutal pain to terrorists in the short run, conveying the Israeli-style lesson that terror attacks bring overwhelming response. Yet it would also convey the notion that, once finished, if terrorists leave the West alone, it will leave the region alone: A carrot-and-stick approach which would, Lind argued, also deny Bin Laden and his successors at least the recruting-poster point of opposing a Western presence that would not, in fact, exist. Such views have little enthusiasm at the top of the Pentagon or in Britain, the two principal combatants in the war on terror. But Lind retains a strong following in the middle echelons of the U.S. brass. "The senior generals don't like his ideas," a colleague comments. "The colonels do." Ultimately, of course, there is no reason why the U.S., Britain, or both, could not heed the first part of Lind's advice, but not the second. The attacks on London could provide a pretext for a final, decisive assualt on Bin Laden in Afghanistan and Pakistan combined. Yet the effort to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq could continue. Were Pakistan to resist such an effort, or even denounce U.S. or British troops as a foreign invasion, it would be unfortunte. But the West could justifiably say that their presence was limited, and temporary -- specifically aimed at avoiding regime change, and confined to whatever parts of the country or countries in the region Bin Laden flees to. In the heat of the moment, the world would understand British-U.S. rage, or, in any case, have to deal with it. Unshaken resolve -- or renewed action? Odds of such a U.S. action against Al Qaeda are probably one in three or less; the possibility of a British collaboration or action little better. Mr. Bush is more likely to respond by suggesting, as he did in the hours after the attack, that the London strikes are an affirmation of Western strategy for remaking the entire region, rather than engaging in a police action against specific perpetrators. Indeed, notably absent from Mr. Blair's or Mr. Bush's comments on 7/7 were any 9/11-like promises to respond directly against the perpetrators. Then again, events may force their hand, or embolden them. Senate Democrats still stinging from their early support for the war in Afghanistan, but later questions about alleged war-on-terror waffling, are reportedly drafting a carefully-worded resolution on the war which will, without criticizing Iraq, encourage the U.S. to look back to its initial war aims of 9/12/01 -- and get Bin Laden, whatever it takes. Iraqi and Israeli officials both would likely welcome a strike that would reduce al-Qaida's network, and divert pressure from their embattled socities. Bottom Line Investors should probably take advantage of the opportunity to buy equities in the coming hours and days. In the day after the analagous Madrid assault, European and U.S. stocks slumped; but the day after, they recovered nearly all their losses. And Madrid's effort led to the election of a socialist government. No such outcome is likely in Britain or the U.S.; indeed, the more likely course will be a revival of unity and support for Mssrs. Bush and Blair. Likewise, the gut-reaction rally in U.S. Treasuries, and against the dollar, on the morning of 7/7, are both temporary. The bearish and cautious will follow the momentum. The far-sighted will rebuild shorts on the 10-year, and long positions on the greenback. Should a U.S.-British strategy for regime change in al-Qaida emerge, there would be a last flurry of concern -- followed by an even larger rally in global stocks and the U.S. dollar. Keep a little powder dry, but it is getting close to a time to be fully invested. Gregory Fossedal, foss@upi.com, is an advisor to international investors on global markets and ideopolitical risk, and a research fellow at the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution. Mr. Fossedal's opinions are entirely his own, and are not necessarily those of his clients, UPI, or AdTI. Furthermore, they are subject to change without notice.