Keeping America's High Tech Edge

Keeping America's High-Tech Edge
Gregory A. Fossedal
Investor's Business Daily
August 9, 1999

An investment magnate put this question to Rep. Chris Cox, R-Calif., just days before the release of the three-volume Cox Committee report on Chinese espionage: "OK, the report comes out. But what are we going to do about it?"

How should the U.S. respond to the purchase, smuggling and outright theft of advanced weapons technologies by China?

The easiest problem to address is Chinese theft of U.S. secrets through espionage. No one defends such activities.

To correct them, the U.S. must tighten security at the national defense laboratories, set up a robust counterintelligence program, and provide more resources and straightforward improvements to security clearance procedures.

These are policy, not political, problems. No one benefits from-lax security standards; U.S. business gains through the sale of products on the open market, and loses when secrets can be easily stolen.

The real crux of Chinese weapon development, especially mass-destruction weapons, involves trade - the materials and information that China has compiled without violating U.S. law.

As the Cox report notes, important Chinese weapon advances were aided in part by the use of high-speed computers bought not through subterfuge, but legitimately on the international market.

Yes, the Chinese have purchased a small number of systems in the speed of 10,000 MTOPS, or millions of theoretical operations per second. But they can also assemble these test computers without a single U.S. export.

Computers in the 2,000 to 6,000 MTOPS range are available on the world market and can be used to construct systems of 10,000 MTOPS and above.

Should the U.S. respond by trying to frustrate our slower, lower-tech opponent? Or should we focus on racing ahead at full speed, winning the race by running faster?

In "The Influence of Sea Power on History," Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that Britain defeated the navies of Spain and France despite the fact that those Continental powers had expended vast resources on armaments.

Britain increased its lead because it was constantly churning out technical innovations. It improved tactics based on those innovations - faster than adversaries could go even by stealing the ideas.

Case in point: Small British ships were able to defeat the Spanish Armada because of Britain's new longrange cannons and battle techniques.

Thus, the most important response to the Cox report might be allowing commercial exports of computer stations up to 20,000 MTOPS, but limiting really critical technologies, like 1-million MTOPS supercomputers.

At the same time, we should improve our military strength after 15 straight years of declining expenditures in real terms. During the Reagan administration, when the U.S. caught and surpassed Soviet military might, America had export controls.

But it also emphasized programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative. Today, even SDI skeptics conclude that the program helped pry open the Soviet Union to democracy.

This strategy requires statesmanship. Republicans must emulate Cox himself - whose bipartisan report focused on hard facts and built common ground for the national interest.

Democrats must decide whether they are finally willing to pay for a real defense against
nuclear attack. This should be America's top strategic priority in an age of mushrooming small nuclear powers.

There is more to be gained, as Defense Secretaries William Perry and Caspar Weinberger argue in a statement released by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, from focusing our export control policies on a few, really dangerous technologies rather than on those available globally.

Ultimately, as Cox wrote, only the Chinese people can determine the fate of their present, undemocratic regime. But by keeping America's high-tech edge sharp, we can create the right kinds of pressure, just as Reagan's SDI strategy helped the cause of Russian democracy.

Keeping America's High-Tech Edge Gregory A. Fossedal Investor's Business Daily August 9, 1999 An investment magnate put this question to Rep. Chris Cox, R-Calif., just days before the release of the three-volume Cox Committee report on Chinese espionage: "OK, the report comes out. But what are we going to do about it?" How should the U.S. respond to the purchase, smuggling and outright theft of advanced weapons technologies by China? The easiest problem to address is Chinese theft of U.S. secrets through espionage. No one defends such activities. To correct them, the U.S. must tighten security at the national defense laboratories, set up a robust counterintelligence program, and provide more resources and straightforward improvements to security clearance procedures. These are policy, not political, problems. No one benefits from-lax security standards; U.S. business gains through the sale of products on the open market, and loses when secrets can be easily stolen. The real crux of Chinese weapon development, especially mass-destruction weapons, involves trade - the materials and information that China has compiled without violating U.S. law. As the Cox report notes, important Chinese weapon advances were aided in part by the use of high-speed computers bought not through subterfuge, but legitimately on the international market. Yes, the Chinese have purchased a small number of systems in the speed of 10,000 MTOPS, or millions of theoretical operations per second. But they can also assemble these test computers without a single U.S. export. Computers in the 2,000 to 6,000 MTOPS range are available on the world market and can be used to construct systems of 10,000 MTOPS and above. Should the U.S. respond by trying to frustrate our slower, lower-tech opponent? Or should we focus on racing ahead at full speed, winning the race by running faster? In "The Influence of Sea Power on History," Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that Britain defeated the navies of Spain and France despite the fact that those Continental powers had expended vast resources on armaments. Britain increased its lead because it was constantly churning out technical innovations. It improved tactics based on those innovations - faster than adversaries could go even by stealing the ideas. Case in point: Small British ships were able to defeat the Spanish Armada because of Britain's new longrange cannons and battle techniques. Thus, the most important response to the Cox report might be allowing commercial exports of computer stations up to 20,000 MTOPS, but limiting really critical technologies, like 1-million MTOPS supercomputers. At the same time, we should improve our military strength after 15 straight years of declining expenditures in real terms. During the Reagan administration, when the U.S. caught and surpassed Soviet military might, America had export controls. But it also emphasized programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative. Today, even SDI skeptics conclude that the program helped pry open the Soviet Union to democracy. This strategy requires statesmanship. Republicans must emulate Cox himself - whose bipartisan report focused on hard facts and built common ground for the national interest. Democrats must decide whether they are finally willing to pay for a real defense against nuclear attack. This should be America's top strategic priority in an age of mushrooming small nuclear powers. There is more to be gained, as Defense Secretaries William Perry and Caspar Weinberger argue in a statement released by the Alexis de Tocqueville Institution, from focusing our export control policies on a few, really dangerous technologies rather than on those available globally. Ultimately, as Cox wrote, only the Chinese people can determine the fate of their present, undemocratic regime. But by keeping America's high-tech edge sharp, we can create the right kinds of pressure, just as Reagan's SDI strategy helped the cause of Russian democracy.