TRACKING CHINA'S NUCLEAR-WEAPONS
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
Loren B. Thompson

Conference on China's Military Modernization Efforts
1539 Longworth House Office Building, U.S. Capitol
March 11, 1998

This morning I would like to briefly discuss that component of Chinese military power that should be of greatest concern to U.S. military planners and political leaders -- nuclear forces, particularly nuclear forces that can be used to strike targets at a significant distance from Chinese territory. No other part of the Chinese arsenal has the potential to impose comparable damage on the United States, its allies and its interests in the Western Pacific. And no other part of the Chinese arsenal has the potential to exert as strong an influence on the policies and behavior of regional actors. When we consider these facts, it must be conceded that Beijing's leaders have been remarkably restrained in their pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Whether because of technical incompetence, competing priorities or fear of superpower responses, China has thus far failed to field a nuclear force that could be called anything other than a minimal deterrent. According to the best available public estimates, that force today consists of -- seventeen or more intercontinental ballistic missiles, each equipped with a single megaton-range warhead; a dozen submarine-launched ballistic missiles on a single nuclear-powered submarine; seventy or more intermediate-range missiles with ranges of between 500 and 1500 nautical miles; and an unknown number of tactical nuclear missiles with ranges of less than 400 nautical miles. The Chinese air force also has 120 B-6 medium bombers, some of which may be nuclear capable -- although lack of aerial refueling capabilities limits the range of these aircraft. In general, the Chinese nuclear force is more noteworthy for what it lacks than what it contains -- All of its intercontinental-range missiles are volatile, liquid-fuel systems deployed in fixed, easily targeted sites. Its single strategic submarine is a noisy vessel approaching 25 years age that seldom puts to sea; its missiles have been successfully fired from the boat only once, ten years ago. All of its strategic missiles lack multiple, independently-targetable reentry vehicles or sophisticated penetration aids that would enable them to overcome western defenses. In view of China's vast economic resources, its regional political and military pretensions, and its propensity for aggressive pronouncements, it is surprising Beijing has not moved beyond its present, primitive nuclear capabilities. That is why many western experts believe the Chinese nuclear arsenal is overdue for modernization. While no one can predict the course of Chinese nuclear modernization, most experts anticipate that Beijing will seek a larger quantity of nuclear systems with several key qualitative upgrades -- First of all, the force needs to be converted to more stable solid rocket motors that are easier to transport and can be launched quickly. Second, the force needs to be made more survivable through road or rail mobility of land-based missiles and more frequent deployments to sea of submarine-based missiles. Third, missiles need greater range to expand target coverage and attack options. Fourth, both intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles need multiple warheads and/or better decoys to assure their penetration through defenses to targets. Finally, the missiles need greater accuracy to assure their limited numbers can strike precisely the most lucrative targets. The Chinese are believed to be pursuing all of these enhancements, although the pace of next-generation deployments is anyone's guess. Given the uneven quality of past Chinese strategic development efforts, even the Beijing leadership probably cannot predict when better nuclear systems will be operational. Richard Fisher of the Heritage Foundation has documented some of the Chinese nuclear modernization efforts, such as the application of Global Positioning System guidance to shorter-range missiles and the pursuit of Russian MIRV technology similar to that used on the massive SS-18 ICBM. One of the most interesting possibilities Mr. Fisher notes is the potential use of foreign cruise-missile technology to provide an air-breathing alternative to ballistic missiles. For the time-being though, the main thrust of the Chinese nuclear threat will be ballistic in nature. The question is, how should we respond? I noted with some amusement an article in last May's edition of Jane's Intelligence Review arguing that the Chinese might accelerate their nuclear modernization if U.S. allies in the Western Pacific begin deploying tactical missile defenses. This same action-reaction logic was the main reason why the U.S. did not deploy active defenses against the Soviet strategic buildup in the latter stages of the Cold War. But the Chinese nuclear force today is so minimal, and defensive technologies have progressed so far, that effective near-term protection really is feasible. In order to achieve adequate levels of protection against shorter-range ballistic threats, U.S. friends in the Western Pacific need a two-tiered defensive system: The first tier could consist of low-cost boost-phase interception capabilities such as those that will be available in the next decade from the Air Force's Airborne Laser. This system would largely nullify the utility of any Chinese efforts to acquire MIRV technology or better penetration aids, since it would intercept missiles prior to release of their warheads. The second tier would be ground-based systems in friendly countries such as Japan and the Republic of China that could intercept the few warheads that managed to leak past an Airborne Laser defense. The Army's THAAD System would be a suitable system for this purpose. These two systems together would greatly diminish the utility of using Chinese nuclear forces to try to influence the behavior of other regional actors. They could not, however, cope with the more challenging defensive mission posed by ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles. To deal with that danger, a thin defense of U.S. national territory combined with the undersea warfare capabilities of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is probably the best solution. Fortunately, the administration -- under pressure from Congress -- is making some progress towards providing a national missile defense deployment option, while the Seventh Fleet's undersea warfare capabilities will be enhanced substantially in the next decade by introduction of a new generation of attack subs. So while Chinese nuclear modernization is definitely a source of concern, solutions to the problem may well be in hand before the next generation of offensive missiles becomes fully operational.

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