Anniversaries are usually a reason for celebrating, but the Army's aviation modernization program is approaching two milestones that are unlikely to produce much merriment. Next year will be the twentieth anniversary of the occasion in 1979 when the service first formally stated a requirement to replace its Vietnam-era fleet of scout and light-attack helicopters. And 1998 marks the fifteenth anniversary since the Army began the LHX program in 1983, an effort that among other things was supposed to satisfy that requirement.

LHX ("light helicopter experimental") eventually became the Comanche program, but due to an Orwellian series of cuts, cancellations, restructurings and delays, the Army is still nearly a decade away from fielding a replacement for its aging fleet of 842 OH-58 Kiowa scouts and 438 Cobra light-attack helicopters. Many of these aircraft have now attained the status of virtual museum pieces, far exceeding the twenty-year service life the Army considers desirable for combat aircraft. Compared with more modern combat helicopters such as the Army's AH-64 Apache tank-killer, the Kiowas and Cobras are underpowered, poorly armed (or unarmed), highly vulnerable to a variety of threats, and ill-equipped to operate at night or in adverse weather. The most capable aircraft in the current light combat fleet, the rebuilt OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, is expected to have only marginal survivability in future battlespaces -- even though current plans envision its retention in the fleet for another twenty years.

All of the Kiowas and Cobras will be replaced by Comanche. The question is when. Even in a business where development cycles are notoriously drawn out, most programs that can trace their origins to the Carter Administration have long since entered serial production (or disappeared). But in a perverse way the delays in fielding Comanche may end up working to the advantage of both the Army and the contractors. When the LHX was first conceived as a sort of all-purpose light helicopter during the early 1980s, the Cold War was still very much in progress. The intellectual ferment surrounding the introduction of digital technologies on the battlefield -- generically known as the "Revolution in Military Affairs" -- did not really begin until after the collapse of communism.

Neither did intensive development of the Comanche, which shed its LHX designation for RAH-66 in 1991 when the Army selected a team led by Boeing Helicopters and United Technologies/Sikorsky to build the first prototypes. While the main driver behind the program has always been the increasing decrepitude of the existing scout and light-attack fleet, the fact that the demonstration/validation (dem/val) phase of Comanche development occurred in the midst of post-Cold War reflection about future missions and requirements has definitely changed the way the Army thinks about the aircraft. This evolution was summed up in February congressional testimony by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer when he called Comanche "the quarterback of the digital battlefield." Reimer put Comanche at the center of the Army's information-age architecture for land warfare, a "terribly important" program that he said would have great "synergy" with other Army systems because of its ability to rapidly collect and disseminate tactical reconnaissance.

This is a remarkable transformation for a program that at times has seemed to be at death's door due to funding constraints. But as the Army's strategic vision for the next century has increasingly focused on the military leverage provided by precise and timely information, it has become apparent that the service's first "armed reconnaissance" aircraft would play a key role in future warfare. Comanche thus is not likely to lose its status as the Army's top modernization priority anytime soon. In a peculiar confluence of events, technological progress, doctrinal change and funding delays have conspired to make it a central feature of the long-term force structure the service calls the "Army After Next."
 

Why Comanche?
 

To understand Comanche's importance, it is useful to bear in mind the basic distinctions between various categories of Army aviation assets. The service's diverse fleet of over 5,000 rotorcraft consists of both combat and transport helicopters. Transport helicopters move soldiers and materiel, but combat helicopters engage directly in air-to-ground and air-to-air warfighting -- which is the main reason why the Army tolerates a thirty-year service life in transport helicopters such as the CH-47 Chinook but prefers no more than twenty years in combat helicopters.

The combat-helicopter inventory is divided among scout and attack helicopters. The scout helicopters are nearly all variants of the OH-58 Kiowa, over 300 of which have recently been upgraded and now are being armed in the Kiowa Warrior configuration. The main role of scouts is to collect and distribute tactical reconnaissance, such as where enemy forces are located and where friendly artillery rounds are falling. Attack helicopters use such information to strike targets on the ground and in the air with missiles and gunfire. The Army's attack fleet currently consists of 438 Cobra light-attack copters and over 700 AH-64 Apache heavy-attack helicopters.

The arming of OH-58D Kiowas blurs the traditional distinction between unarmed scouts and armed attack helicopters, but even the most advanced Kiowas remain at heart Vietnam-era observation helicopters. Some Cobras have been upgraded for night operations, but they too are showing their age. The Comanche was conceived as the Army's first combat aircraft that would be sufficiently survivable, lethal and versatile to be equally adept at tactical-reconnaissance and attack missions.

In terms of survivability, Comanche incorporates more low-observables , or "stealth," features than any other aircraft in Army history. Its composite airframe has less than one percent of the radar cross-section of a Kiowa. Its engines and skin radiate only half the heat emissions of a Kiowa. And the noise generated by its rotor -- a critical survivability concern in low-flying scout aircraft-- is 50% that of a Kiowa. Additional survivability features not present in earlier combat helicopters include a sealed cabin for protection against chemical and biological threats, improved airframe resilience against ballistic damage, enhanced crash-worthiness, and reduced susceptibility to electromagnetic interference (such as that associated with electronic or information warfare).

In terms of lethality, Comanche will carry a combination of weapons and targeting aids surpassed only by the much bigger Apache. On a typical reconnaissance mission Comanche could internally carry four Hellfire antitank missiles, two Stinger air-to-air missiles, and 320 rounds of ammunition for its 20mm Gatling gun (internal carriage greatly reduces radar returns). Equipped for maximum attack capability, the Comanche can internally and externally carry 14 Hellfires or 28 Stingers or 56 Hydra rockets plus its gun ammunition. In either case, targeting would be aided by a second-generation forward-looking infrared sensor, a low-light-level television, a laser range-finder and designator, and the Longbow millimeter-wave radar.

It is in the areas of target detection, classification and identification that Comanche most clearly exhibits its versatility. Digital sensors, computers and software enable it to track and recognize adversaries long before they are aware of Comanche's presence, a key advantage in both reconnaissance and attack roles. Comanche's versatility is further bolstered by digital communications links to Joint Stars surveillance aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and other joint surveillance and reconnaissance assets. These links enable Comanche's two-man crew to achieve unparalleled situational awareness. Comanche thus becomes an integral component in a battlespace information network, both generating and receiving tactical intelligence that facilitates optimal wartime use of all friendly forces.

The Comanche's mission flexibility is greatly enhanced by the ability to operate safely at night, in adverse weather, and in the presence of battlefield obscurants. The absence of this capability on many current-generation scout and light-attack helicopters is a major constraint on wartime effectiveness. Another constraint is the inability of many existing Army helicopters to operate well at higher altitudes and hotter temperatures, such as those found in some Middle-East areas. Comanche addresses this deficiency with an advanced engine capable of sustaining 175 kt. speeds, more than enough to keep up with the powerful Apache. Although designed for easy transport on current airlift assets, the Comanche also has sufficient range -- 1,260 nm. -- that it could self-deploy from the U.S. to remote areas of Eurasia if necessary.

For all its sophistication, though, the Comanche is expected to be a highly maintainable aircraft. Having incurred huge costs in supporting a mixed fleet of Vietnam-vintage and newer rotorcraft, the Army was determined that its only new helicopter for the foreseeable future have much-reduced life-cycle costs compared with the aircraft being replaced. Comanche will achieve this through modular electronics architecture, built-in diagnostic tools, and a variety of other design innovations. Only six tools will be required for flightline maintenance of the engine, and less than three dozen for the entire aircraft. Three soldiers will be able to refuel and rearm Comanche under wartime conditions in less than 15 minutes.
 

On Track
 

Aerospace expert Richard Aboulafia of the Virginia-based Teal Group describes Comanche's programmatic history as a "roller-coaster ride" of unexpected twists and turns. Despite the unpredictability of the program's recent history, though, prime contractors Boeing and UTC/Sikorsky have managed to keep their roller-coaster on track through a disciplined design-to-cost process. There has been minimal deviation from planned schedules and costs, and the contractors anticipate little difficulty on meeting near-term milestones.

Those milestone included the first flight of a second prototype in 1999 (the initial prototype has been flying since 1996) and delivery of six "early operational capability" aircraft during 2001-2002. Low-rate production is expected to begin 2004, with initial operating capability for a planned force of 1,292 aircraft commencing in 2006. However, most of those craft will not be produced and reach the field until the second and third decades of the next century, providing the core tactical-reconnaissance and light-attack assets of the Army After Next. With such a long timeline and few alternative options, the Army and the contractors know they have to get Comanche right. After years of uncertainty, it appears that they are finally on their way to success.